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ANTHONYJ. SCIRICAt
Arguably the most vexing issue in modem civil litigation is the
problem of personal injury mass torts-the accumulation of thou-
sands (even millions) of claims through class actions or through ag-
gregation in grouping individual lawsuits. Especially problematic are
personal injury suits that are truly national in scope, implicating pri-
marily state law, involving unresolved issues of causation and the pos-
sibility of latent injury. In many cases, these claims compete for a lim-
ited fund or insufficient assets and may threaten the financial stability
of the defendants. Multiple individual filings threaten prompt adju-
dication of legitimate claims. Unreasonable delay, limited funds, and
disparate verdicts on liability and damages raise serious questions of
fairness. But aggregation has its price. It threatens individual consid-
eration of cases and undermines the traditional lawyer/client rela-
tionship. Which prompts the question-how much aggregation, at
what point in the litigation, and for what purpose?
In November 1999, the University of Pennsylvania Law School
sponsored a Mass Torts Symposium to discuss these and other issues.
The Symposium drew on and continued the work of the Judicial Con-
ference's Mass Torts Working Group. Symposium participants-in-
cluding federal and state judges, litigators and corporate general
counsel, academicians, and public interest lawyers-deliberated on
federal/state issues, the problems of claims that may be made in the
future, certification, settlement and closure of national mass tort ac-
tions, the unique problems of bankruptcy, and the costs and benefits
of mass tort litigation.
t United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Judge Scirica also served as
Chair of the Judicial Conference's Mass Torts Working Group.
' As discussed infra at text accompanying notes 13-16, the Mass Torts Working
Group was commissioned in 1998 to identify the most serious issues of the mass torts
phenomenon, analyze the most promising solutions, and report back in one year.
Spearheaded by the United States Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules and its chair, Judge Paul Niemeyer; the Group also comprised select members of
the Judicia Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, and the Judicial Conference Committees
on Bankruptcy, Court Administration and Management, Federal-State Jurisdiction,
and MagistrateJudges. It received invaluable assistance from the FederalJudicial Cen-
ter and from many committee staff and academicians, including Professors Edward
Cooper, Geoffrey Hazard, and Francis McGovern.
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Not all mass claims are problematic. Since the 1966 revision of
Rule 23, the federal legal system has, to a greater or lesser degree, sat-
isfactorily accommodated class actions in antitrust, securities, con-
sumer fraud, and employment discrimination. The adoption of the
Multidistrict Litigation ("MDL") statute2 and the discerning and re-
sourceful actions of the MDL panel and transferee judges have per-
mitted the fair and expeditious resolution of many mass claims.
When over time serious mass claim problems were perceived,
Congress and the Supreme Court Rules Committees responded with
changes in substantive and procedural law.3 In securities fraud, for
example, Congress responded to perceived abuses of strike suits in
private securities actions by amending both substantive and proce-
dural law. The principal procedural changes raised the bar in bring-
ing suit and gave parties with the highest stakes an opportunity to con-
trol the outcome of the litigation.4 The principal substantive change
provided a safe harbor for forward-looking statements.,5
Similarly, the Judicial Conference Rules Committees responded to
the risk of improvident and largely unreviewable class certification de-
cisions by amending Rule 23. Granting or denying class certification
is the defining moment in many class actions, for it may sound the
death knell of the litigation or create irresistible pressure to settle.
Accordingly, Rule 23 was amended to provide for an interlocutory ap-
peal by permission of the court of appeals.6 In addition, the amend-
ment will facilitate development of the law on class certification.7
2 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1994).
3 Of course, the MDL statute was a congressional and judicial response to mass
claims.
4 See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat.
743, 743-49, (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b) (Supp. II 1996)). The congressional
amendments in procedure represented a departure from the uniform and transsub-
stantive nature of the federal rules and constituted a deviation from the procedures set
forth in the Rules Enabling Act. 23 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (1994).
" See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, § 102,
109 Stat. 737, 749-56 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2, 78u-5 (Supp. II 1996)).
6 SeeFED. R. CIv. P. 23(f).
7 Of course, class certification is not the only procedural issue implicated by mass
claims. The Rules Committees continue to study other facets of Rule 23, including the
advisability of settlement-only classes after Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591 (1997), and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S. Ct. 2295 (1999); strength-
ening the requirements for notice; appointment of class counsel; class counsel's fidu-
ciary responsibilities; and setting standards for judicia approval of settlements and at-
torney fee awards.
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Personal injury mass torts, however, are another matter.8 They
have proved less amenable to similar substantive and procedural solu-
tions. In some mass torts-like asbestos-delay and extraordinary
transactions costs (approaching two-thirds of recovered damages) 9
diminish the value of legitimate claims. Ten years ago, Judge Robert
Parker pointedly described one impact of the massive asbestos litiga-
tion: "Four hundred and forty-eight members of the class have died
waiting for their cases to be heard."10 Judge Parker also noted that
even if the court then could have closed thirty cases a month, it still
would have taken six and a half years to try the cases in that 3000-
member class action, during which time 5000 more cases would have
been filed." A decade later, asbestos litigation problems persist.12 In
another mass tort case-breast implants--defendants have paid bil-
lions of dollars for claims not as yet supported by verifiable scientific
evidence.
Two years ago, the Judicial Conference Working Group on Mass
Torts, under the guidance of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules,
commenced its inquiry. The Working Group considered concepts
central to the mass tort issue: maturity and elasticity, centralization
versus devolution, and the incentives and disincentives in bringing
suit. The Working Group also delved into many of the finer points of
8 For example, unlike many class action claims, these torts often involve individual
claims for substantial damages; accordingly, these claims feasibly may be pursued as
stand-alone cases.
9 SeeJAMEs S. KAKALrK ET AL., COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIGATION (1983). Although
the study reporting on these figures is somewhat dated, the trend appears to continue.
See, e.g., Amchem, 521 U.S. at 598 (noting that costs exceed recoveries by two to one).
'0 Cimino v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 649, 651 (E.D. Tex. 1990), rev'd,
151 F.3d 297 (5th Cir. 1998).
" See id. at 651-52.
2 For example, asbestos cases continue to swamp courts. In the past five years,
nearly 40,000 new asbestos cases were filed in federal courts alone. See Administrative
Office of the Courts Statistics, U.S. District Courts Civil Cases Commenced by Nature of Suit,
(Table C-2A) (Feb. 2000) <http://-ww.uscourts.gov/judbus1999/c02asep99.pdf>.
And plaintiffs are suing a broader range of defendants, from hospitals that installed
asbestos ceiling tiles to "banks that financed asbestos-contaminated properties." Susan
Warren, Asbestos Suits Target Makers of Wine, Cars, Soups, Soaps, WAIL ST. J., Apr. 12,
2000, at B1. Although precise numbers are unavailable, significant numbers of asbes-
tos cases have been and continue to be filed in state courts.
's See, e.g., MARCIA ANGELL. SCIENCE ON TRiAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVMENCE
AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST CANCER CASE (1996) (concluding that breast implants do
not substantially increase the risk of breast cancer); Hans Berkel et al., Breast Augmen-
tation: A Risk Factor for Breast Cancer, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1649 (1992) (same);
Heather Bryant & Penny Brashen, Breast Implants and Breast Cancer-Reanalysis of a
Linkage Study, 332 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1535 (1995) (same).
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mass tort litigation: the race to the courthouse for limited assets; the
allocation of limited funds; the allocation of settlements by lawyers;
unreasonably high transaction costs, including attorney's fees; collu-
sive settlements; reverse auctions; forum shopping for trial or settle-
ment; overlapping and competing class actions; "home cooking" in
certain state courts and counties; fraudulent joinder to defeat diver-
sity; choice of law issues; multiple punitive damages; resolving causa-
tion where the science is unclear; and the unique problems with fu-
tures claimants-asymptomatic plaintiffs in unlimited numbers, the
difficulty in estimating damages in futures claims, and statute of limi-
tations problems with the exposure-only plaintiff. The Working
Group also was informed about duplicative and wasteful discovery;
premature aggregation; the advisability of individual verdicts to ascer-
tain liability and the range of damages; the need for closure of a ma-
ture tort; collateral litigation over insurance coverage; back door opt-
outs; the "full faith and credit" significance and other consequences of
overlapping class actions; efficiency and aggregation as compared with
congestion and individual consideration; and the need for coopera-
tion between federal and state courts.14
Throughout its study, the Working Group encountered ways at-
torney conduct appeared to shape the incentives in bringing suit, the
course of litigation, and settlement. The identified issues included se-
lection of counsel; the first-filed rule; solicitation of plaintiffs; the basis
for determining attorney's fees;'5 the fiduciary responsibility of coun-
sel; conflicts of interest; ethical considerations; charging contingent
fees after settling cases on administrative grid-like schedules;
"scorched earth" and "stonewalling" tactics by defense counsel; and
"piling-on" strategies by plaintiffs' counsel with marginal claims. Un-
derlying the inquiry into the impact of attorney conduct is an unre-
solved question: the concept of the "private attorney general," and
the extent to which private attorneys should be able to vindicate the
claims of persons with whom they have no direct relationship. Corre-
spondingly, this concern raises the issue of the proper role of the fed-
eral and state attorneys general in litigating these broad-scale claims.
" See generally ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & WORKING GROUP ON MASS
TORTS, REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION (Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON
MASS TORT LITIGATION]. See also Thomas E. Willging, Mass Torts Problems & Proposals,
in REPORT ON MASS TORT LITIGATION, supra, app. C.
15 Some have asked whether it is possible to construct a procedure to provide both
an incentive and a reasonable return, other than percentage of common fund or lode-
star.
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The Mass Torts Working Group issued its Report in 1999.16 Rec-
ognizing that the essential components for change were legislation,
procedural rules, case management, and judicial education, the Work-
ing Group identified the principal problems in mass torts, proposed
different models for resolution, recommended further study, and
prepared the ground for further action. This Symposium builds on
those efforts.
• 17
Congress is also involved in mass tort issues. Both the House and
Senate Judiciary Committees have held hearings on class actions. And
in both houses, bills have been introduced to address class actions in
general18 and to resolve the outstanding asbestos cases. 9 After passing
the federal Y2K Act,20 Congress is actively considering class action re-
moval legislation based on minimal diversity.2 Another pending bill,
in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Lexecon Inc. v. Milherg
Weiss Bershad Hynes &" Lerach,t " would permit MDL transferee judges to
try transferred cases.2
As we work to identify and resolve these problems of mass torts, we
should keep in mind that all of these concerns implicate competing
16 REPORT ON MASS TORT LrGATION, supra note 14.
17 In 1991, the Judicial Conference proposed that Congress consider a national
legislative scheme to streamline asbestos case resolution. See Amcher, 521 U.S. at 598-
99 (citing Report of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 33
(Mar. 12, 1991)). This proposal was based on the recommendation of the Confer-
ence's Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation, appointed by Chief Justice
Rehnquist. See i&L Notably, in its most recent class action decisions, the Supreme
Court specifically urged Congress to deal with the "elephantine mass of asbestos cases."
Id. (citing recommendation by Judicial Conference Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos
Litigation for federal legislation creating a national asbestos dispute resolution
scheme); see also Oriz, 119 S. Ct. at 2302-03 n.1 (1999) (reiterating the call for national
legislation and noting Congress's failure to respond).
'8 See, e.g., Class Action Fairness Act of 1999, S. 353, 106th Cong. (1999) (requiring,
for example, plain-language notices to class members and advance notice of settle-
ments to state and federal attorneys general).
19 See Fairness in Asbestos Compensation Act of 1999, H.R. 1283, 106th Cong.
(1999) (establishing an Office of Asbestos Compensation to determine if an asbestos
claimant is entitled to compensation, and if so, how much); S. 758, 106th Cong. (1999)
(paralleling H.R. 1283).
20 Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, 113 Stat. 185 (1999). The Act provides that aY2K
class action may be tried in federal court if the amount in controversy exceeds $10 mil-
lion, and the plaintiff class consists of at least 100 members.
21 See Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R. 1875, 106th Cong.
(1999) (passed by U.S. House of Representatives, Sept. 23, 1999).
2 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
2 See Multidistrict, Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 1999, H.R.
2112, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999). The same bill also provides for removal of mass torts
arising from single sits accidents. See id. § 3.
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principles and cross many lines: most significantly, the distinction be-
tween substantive and procedural law, and the principles of federal-
ism-the proper allocation of jurisdiction between state and federal
courts. In mass torts, the line between substance and procedure can
be blurred. We know that procedure influences outcome. Few would
deny that the aggregation of claims has a profound effect on the sub-
stantive rights of the parties-both aggregation under Rule 23 and
aggregation in grouping individual claims.
One way to look at the problem is to ask how receptive the federal
courts should be to nationwide causes of action that largely involve
state law, and if so, should theirjurisdiction extend through the entire
proceeding, including trial? Or, to put it another way, should tort ac-
tions national in scope be handled in state court, and if so, for what
purposes? From a policy standpoint, it can be argued that national
(interstate) class actions are the paradigm for federal diversity juris-
diction because in a constitutional sense, they implicate interstate
commerce and foreclose any state bias. Arguably, a legal system that
permits robust litigation of mass tort claims should also provide ways
to fairly and efficiently resolve those claims. Nationwide class actions
appear to promote at least one aspect of faimess--similarly situated
claimants receive similar treatment. 24
Conversely, if state bias can be eliminated and a way can be found
to preserve defendants' assets from multiple compensatory and puni-
tive damage awards that will deplete the funds available for all claim-
ants,s then state courts-which greatly outnumber federal courts-
may be the more suitable fora for trials and to ascertain liability and
range of damages. Furthermore, state and federal court cooperation
and coordination may be able to mitigate problems of discovery du-
plication and overlapping class actions.
The excellent Symposium papers and the proposed models ad-
dress the key issues, and are crucial to the debate. As we continue, we
must keep in mind the aim of our inquiry: a just process in which a
person with a legitimate claim (where liability can be proven) is able
to get appropriate relief without undue delay and without undue
costs. The papers presented at the Mass Torts Symposium, and the
24 It is usually helpful to compare alternative approaches. In certain cases, the
prospect of high costs, long delays, and limited assets for recovery may negate any real-
istic alternative to class actions.
2 These goals also may be accomplished in a bankruptcy proceeding, which brings
before the bankruptcy court all of the debtor's assets and all claims against those assets,
then seeks to treat equally all similarly situated claimants.
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ensuing discussion by the Symposium participants, move us closer to
the goal.
* * * * * *
